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Abstract: Do higher wages prevent corruption (bribe taking)? We investigate
a setting where individuals who apply for public sector jobs are motivated not
just by monetary incentives but also by intrinsic motivation and concern for the
collective reputation of their profession. We show that an increase in monetary
compensation may cause reputation concerned individuals to be more prone to
participate in corruption due to an ”overjustification” effect. The overall effect of
monetary incentives on fighting corruption crucially depends on the composition
of the pool of public sector workers for two reasons: first, different types of
workers react differently to the same policy; second, the composition of the pool
of workers affects individual behaviour through its effect on collective reputation.
These results imply in particular that policies to fight corruption should focus
more on increasing the collective reputation of the public sector rather than
using monetary incentives which have perverse effects on some agents.
Keywords: Corruption, Collective Reputation, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Moti-
vation.
JEL Classification Number: A13, D73, H10, Z13
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1 Introduction
“ Corresponding to the three types in the city, the soul also is tripartite, [...] we
speak of this [the first] part of the soul, and justify our calling it the money-loving
and gain-loving part? And [the second part] it is wholly set on predominance
and victory and good repute [...] But surely it is obvious to everyone that all
the endeavour of the [third] part by which we learn is ever towards knowledge
of the truth of things, and that it least of the three is concerned for wealth and
reputation [...] And that is why we say that the primary classes of men also are
three, the philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the lover of
gain.”
—Plato in the Republic book 9, sections 580d-581c
Low wages are often cited as a cause of bureaucratic corruption (see Becker
and Stigler, 1974; Chand and Moene, 1997; Amir and Burr, 2015) and the use
of ”efficiency” wages to fight bribery has been proposed as a solution (see Rijck-
eghem and Weder, 2001; Mahmood, 2005). However, evidence for the effect of
monetary incentives as an anti-corruption measure is still quite mixed (see e.g.,
Treisman, 2000 and Swamy et al. 2001). A large body of field and experimen-
tal evidence indicates that monetary incentives and punishment may actually
serve as ”negative reinforcers” for the desired behaviour because they some-
times conflict with non-pecuniary motivation (see, e.g., Titmuss, 1970; Akerlof
and Dickens, 1982; Deci and Ryan, 1985).
As in Plato’s description of the different motivations that drive the human
soul (see quotation above), recent research has also been highlighting the differ-
ent possible motivations that drive man-not just love of money, but also moral
values, and the love of praise.1 Policies that aim to affect agents’ behaviour may
have very different outcomes, depending on which types of agents this policy
addresses (see Tirole, 1994; Mishra and Samuel, 2016).
In this paper, we study how heterogeneity in individuals’ motivations affects
policies targeting corruption. Corruption is defined as bribe-taking behaviour
while in public office. We assume that individuals not only have monetary
incentives but also intrinsic motivation and reputation concerns to be honest.
1Mill (1909) firstly pointed the limitation of the economic approach in focusing exclusively
on material incentives without concerns for every other human passion or motive. Fehr and
Falk (2002) introduced individuals’ motivation to reciprocate, the desire for social approval
and the intrinsic enjoyment to work on interesting tasks to shape agents’ behaviour. Caselli
and Morelli (2003) developed a model of the elective office rewarded by ’ego rents’, i.e., social
status and power.
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Simply put, reputation concerns stem from the inference drawn by the general
public about an individual’s motivations for performing an action. When mon-
etary incentives increase, this inference is negatively affected and may lead to a
crowding out of intrinsic motivation that is driven by image concerns. Titmuss,
1970 and Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006 discuss the case of blood donation- when
the monetary rewards for donating blood increase, those individuals who care
about the perception of intentions may stop donating blood. This is referred to
as the ”overjustification effect” (Lepper and Greene, 1973): extrinsic incentives
destroy the reputational value of good deeds.2
We build on Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006 in formalising the ”overjustification
effect” and provide a simple theoretical foundation of the crowding out effect on
reputational concerns for honesty that monetary incentives may induce. In the
psychological literature, Lepper and Greene (1973) e.g. observed that ”when an
individual observes another person engaging in some activity, he infers that the
other is intrinsically motivated to engage in that activity to the extent that he
does not perceive salient, unambiguous, and sufficient extrinsic contingencies to
which to attribute the other’s behaviour”. In line with this idea, we model col-
lective reputation as the expected level of intrinsic motivation of honest agents.
Professional reputation is high when honest behaviour is driven by intrinsic mo-
tivations and not by extrinsic incentives, like the fear of losing a well-paid job.
Agents care about public perception of their degree of intrinsic motivation to be
honest relative to their own internal moral standard, rather than by perception
of honesty itself.3 While it is hard to measure professional reputation defined
in this way, public perception of the degree of intrinsic motivation for the job
is plausibly positively correlated with occupational prestige: thus while fire-
fighters figure high on occupational prestige, accountants, bankers, real estate
agents have low prestige. We claim that this is at least partly because firefight-
ers are paid less and thus it is more convincing that they are truly intrinsically
motivated.4
2Rewards create doubt about the true motive for which prosocial behaviour is performed
(Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006).
3In the words of Adam Smith (1759) : ”Nature, ... She taught him to feel pleasure in
their favourable, and pain in their unfavourable regard. She rendered their approbation most
flattering and most agreeable to him for its own sake, and their disapprobation most mortifying
and most offensive.”
4Further indirect evidence can be found in the survey made by Harris Interactive in 2014
looking at occupational prestige in the US the occupations with the highest prestige are:
doctors (88% adults considering it to have either a great deal of prestige or prestige), military
officers (78%), firefighters (76%), scientists (76%), and nurses (70%). At the other end of
the spectrum, real estate broker/agent is the profession with the highest percentage of adults
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Our first main result is to show conditions under which higher salaries may
have a perverse effect on total corruption, even when there are no selection
issues. The intuition behind this result is as follows. On the one hand, as is
typical in standard models of corruption, a wage increase lowers ”greedy” (i.e.
extrinsically motivated) agents’ incentives to accept bribes, because it raises
the opportunity cost of being corrupt. This raises the level of honesty in the
profession. On the other hand, outsiders’ perception of the level of intrinsic
motivation to be honest in the profession is negatively affected when salaries
increase, because outsiders no longer attribute honesty to intrinsic motivations
but rather to the fear of losing a well-paid job. This reduction of the professional
reputation implies that reputation concerned agents have lower incentives to be
honest as the opportunity cost of being corrupt goes down. The overall effect,
therefore, depends on the relative weights that monetary and non-monetary
motivations have in the reputation-concerned officers’ utility function, as well
as on their internal moral standards.
Our second main result is about selection: Suppose there is a private sector
which only offers wage incentives but does not have any mission orientation so
that intrinsic motivation plays no role. We then analyse the selection effects of
a negative shock on private sector salaries. We show conditions under which
selection of extrinsically motivated officers in the public sector causes a crowding
out of intrinsic motivation due to reputation effects on reputation concerned
agents. When the fraction of such agents is large enough, higher public sector
wages may lead to higher corruption.
Overall, the paper highlights a mechanism which may explain why there is
such conflicting evidence on the effect of higher wages to prevent bribe-taking
in the public sector. It also suggests that rather than focusing on wages which
can backfire, optimal policies to reduce corruption should take account of the
competing motivations for public sector work and the importance of maintain-
ing a high status in the public sector as opposed to private sector work. Even
though each individual is motivated by monetary incentives, the net effect of
non-monetary incentives is more straightforward than the use of monetary mo-
tivations.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a brief
literature review, Section 3 describes the model, Section 4 summarizes the main
findings on how increasing salaries in the public sector affect total corruption.
considering it to have less prestige (73%), jointly with stockbrokers, bankers (62%), and
accountants (60%).
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Section 5 adds the private sector to the model. Finally Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Classic incentive literature argues that pure income maximisation is a core
source of corruption (see e.g., Andvig and Moene, 1990; Acemoglu, 1995; Aidt,
2003; Sah, 2007) and the key to reducing corruption is to increase the minimum
salary above what they can get elsewhere (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Chank
and Moene, 1997), thereby increasing the opportunity cost of taking bribes.
However, recent research suggests that wage increases may be an expensive
and inefficient way to fight corruption (Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001, Bardhan,
2015) and may even encourage it (Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang, 2015). Indeed
the recent literature on corruption highlights the role of non-monetary incen-
tives, such as moral costs and social norms (see e.g., Polinsky and Shavell, 2000;
Spichtig and Traxler, 2011). Our paper fits in with this latter approach where
we take a more behavioural perspective on the motivations of public servants.
Our paper also ties into the large psychology literature on intrinsic moti-
vation and crowding out. We use the psychological definition of intrinsic mo-
tivation, i.e., commencing an activity because it is absorbing and gratifying
in itself, as opposed to initiating an activity for external prods, pressures, or
rewards (Deci and Ryan, 1985). There is also substantial evidence from psy-
chologists and sociologists that expected explicit rewards and punishments to
perform a task sometimes may undermine a person’s intrinsic motivation (e.g.,
Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Deci, Koestner and Ryan, 1999). The crowd-
ing out effect has been used to explain the failure of incentive schemes in some
principal-agent settings both theoretically (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2003, Ellingsen
and Johannesson, 2008) and empirically (Frey, 1997; Fehr and Gachter, 2001;
Pokorny, 2008). Schulze and Frank (2003) show that the net effect of deterrence
on overall corruption is a priori undetermined because deterrence increases the
risk of being corrupt but erodes individual’s intrinsic motivation for honesty.
Our paper is similar in using crowding out effects but our focus is on image
concerns or reputation concerns- we explicitly allow individuals to lose their
desire to act pro-socially when their intentions are misattributed. Secondly,
the presence of ”greedy” agents in the pool, implies that higher monetary in-
centives crowd out intrinsic motivation. The negative externality imposed by
extrinsically motivated agents in the pool causes crowding out in our model.
This is similar to Tirole (1996) who argues that agents’ incentives are not only
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determined by their own reputation, but also by that of the groups they be-
long to. However, Tirole (1996) does not investigate the crowding out of honest
behaviour due to the overjustification effect.
The paper is most closely related to Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) (BT) in that
agents value being perceived as having a high level of intrinsic motivation and
gain negative reputation as being ”greedy” or money-motivated and a higher
incentive rate reduces the informativeness of actions about intrinsic motivation,
while increasing it about monetary motivation. In other words, rewards create
doubt about the true motive for prosocial behavior, and this ”overjustification
effect” can induce a crowding out of good behavior. In line with BT, we define
the reputation payoff as others’ belief as whether the action was taken due to pe-
cuniary or intrinsic motivations (intention-based reputation payoffs). Building
on BT, we assume that reputational benefit depends linearly on observers’ pos-
terior expectations of the agent’s type and there is heterogeneity in individual’s
level of reputation concerns which creates noise in the ”signal extraction” prob-
lem. However, our paper differs from BT in an important aspect. In our model,
the individual payoff of prosocial behaviour does not depend on the public per-
ception alone, but on the difference between the public perception and their
own intrinsic motivation as well. As discussed earlier, the model recognises that
it is not collective reputation for honest behaviour that matters but the motives
that the public attributes to the behaviour. Moreover, it is collective reputation
relative to the individual’s internal moral standard that matters.
Finally, Machiavello’s (2008) model assumes that workers are heterogeneous
in terms of public sector motivation so that low public sector wage premia
helps screen workers with intrinsic motivation, while high wage helps motivate
workers to be honest. In his model, private sector wages are endogenous and
depend on the quality of governance in the public sector. His model yields a non-
monotonic relationship between wages and corruption: at low wages intrinsically
motivated individuals are attracted to the public sector, as a result governance
is good and private sector salaries are high- positive assortative matching takes
place in equilibrium. If however, wages are too low then all agents are corrupt
and private sector wages are also low. When wages increase in the public sec-
tor, it attracts some extrinsically motivated agents who cannot get high enough
wages in the private sector, but will behave opportunistically in the public sec-
tor. This sustains the low wages in the private sector. At a basic level, the
paper discusses how heterogeneous motivations imply that higher wages do not
necessarily help to reduce corruption (increase the public sector motivation).
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However the mechanism he highlights is different from ours: there are no image
concerns, the behaviour of each type of agent depends only on wages and in-
trinsic motivation. Different from Machiavello (2008), our model would predict
that public sector jobs can be differentiated according to whether they attract
highly motivated individuals who also have image concerns or whether they
attract individuals with low intrinsic motivation and high image concerns be-
cause the impact of higher wages varies according to this. While he does find a
pattern - non monotonic relationship between wages and corruption, our main
point is to explain why the empirical evidence does not find much evidence in
either direction. We argue that this is because it will be hard to find systematic
patterns as wages vary when individuals are motivated by image concerns about
their intrinsic motivation.
Valasek (2016) follows Tirole’s(1996) definition of collective reputation and
shows that a non-monotonic wage path may be optimal to reform an institu-
tional culture, attracting motivated agents. In Valasek’s model, the level of
collective reputation equals the fraction of honest agents, and therefore only
depends on their behaviour and not on their motivation. Differently, in our
model, collective reputation depends both on heterogeneity in agents’ motives
and behaviour.
3 The Model
3.1 Basic setup
Below we use the words individuals, agents and officers interchangeably. There
is a mass 1 of individuals. We consider a standard model of corruption in which
an officer, who receives a salary w ≥ 0 for her job, decides whether or not
to accept a bribe B > 0. If she accepts the bribe, then she is caught with a
probability q ∈ (0, q¯) with q¯ < 1. Let B denote the amount of exogenous bribe,
q the probability of getting caught accepting a bribe and w the wage rate.
There are three types of officers t ∈ {G,R, S}: For simplicity of notation we
refer to the three types as ”greedy” officers (G), in proportion β, ”reputation-
concerned” officers (R) , in proportion α and ”saints” (S), in proportion γ, where
β + γ + α = 1. All types care about the salary they get. Greedy officers care
only about monetary incentives. Saints are highly intrinsically motivated, such
that even with zero wage they would not accept a bribe. Reputation-concerned
officers have a positive level of intrinsic motivation and are also motivated by
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the desire for praise (reputation).
Let vt ≥ 0 denote type t officers’ intrinsic valuation for being honest and
θt ≥ 0 the weight on their concern for reputation. We assume (vG, θG) = (0, 0),
(vS , θS) = (v
S , 0) with vS ≥ (1−q)B−qw ≡ v¯, which guarantees that they never
participate in corruption, and finally, (vR, θR) = (v
R, θR) with vR ∈ (0, vS) and
θR > 0. Officers’ type is private information, while the proportion of each type
in the population, as the levels of v, and θ for each type, are common knowledge.
The utility function of an honest officer of type t is
Uhonestt (δ) = w + vt + θt[qc(δ)− vt]. (1)
The term c(δ) measures officers’ collective reputation and depends on the be-
havior of each type and δt is the fraction of honest officers of type t and
δ ≡ (δG, δR, δS).
If a corrupt officer is charged, she gets zero utility; while if she is not, she
gets
U corruptt (δ) = (1− q)[w +B + θtqc(δ)].
We define the collective reputation c(δ) as the expected level of an honest
officer’s intrinsic motivation:5
c(δ) ≡ δRαvR + δSγvS + δGβvG
δGβ + δRα+ δSγ
.
As in Lepper and Greene (1973) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), collective
reputation is high when officers’ honest behaviour is driven by intrinsic motiva-
tions and not by extrinsic incentives, like the fear of losing a well-paid job. We
assume that the reputational payoff of an individual is the difference between
the collective reputation discounted by q and her own intrinsic motivation.6 By
assumption, this is different from zero only for reputation-concerned officers.
Whether a certain level of praise is a reputational loss or gain for an R−type
officer depends on her own behaviour and the level of intrinsic motivation: an
honest R − type officer considers any level of praise lower than her intrinsic
motivation as a reputational loss, qc < vR, while for a corrupt officer any positive
level of praise is a reputational gain. Thus an R− type officer is motivated to be
honest when the public rewards her for a higher level of honesty than her own
5Notice that, for any given equilibrium strategy profile, collective reputation is uniquely
determined.
6When q is low (high), then the probability that an officer who is not caught is actually
honest are low (high). Therefore, when the probability of detecting corruption is low in a
country, the perceived collective reputation qc(δ) will be low.
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intrinsic motivation to be honest (undeserved praise). On the other hand, the
R − type officer gets disutility from being honest when the public credits her
with a lower level of intrinsic motivation than her actual level and is therefore
encouraged to be corrupt (undeserved shame).7 When honour or shame is felt it
is only with regard to an internal moral compass in our model. This is important
because individuals with high moral values may be systematically attracted to
some types of jobs. There can be both crowding in and crowding out of intrinsic
motivation in our model- the initial level of intrinsic motivation of R types in
the population is key. This implies that it is in precisely those jobs which attract
highly motivated individuals and have high occupational prestige (firefighters,
nurses, scientists), that increases in salary have a deleterious effect.
3.2 Officers’ behaviour
We want to analyse how a change in the salary offered to officers affect their
propensity to accept a bribe, depending on their type. We restrict our analysis
to symmetric equilibrium. From now on, let δt ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that
an officer of type t refuses the bribe. By assumption, S − type officers never
accept any bribe, and therefore in equilibrium δS = 1. G−type officers only care
about monetary incentives and therefore their behaviour depends exclusively on
the salary offered to them. A G− type officer chooses to be honest if and only
if
w ≥ (1− q)(w +B), (2)
defining a cutoff rule on the wage:
w ≥ (1− q)
q
B ≡ w∗H . (3)
Observe that as q → 0, w∗H → +∞, i.e, if the probability of being charged
becomes negligible, the minimum salary necessary to keep a G − type officer
honest becomes arbitrarily large. The bribe is exchanged as long as the penalty,
i.e., the probability of detection, is small enough (as shown in Basu et al., 2015).
The following simple proposition directly follows from the above analysis.8
7If vR = 0, i.e., R-type officials don’t have intrinsic motivation, the analysis would corre-
spond to the case in which they only care about the collective reputation. We discuss this
case in the conclusion.
8The analysis could be extended to the case where vG > 0. We prefer to keep the assump-
tion that greedy officers are not intrinsically motivated to have a standard selfish type in our
model. If vG > 0 the main difference is that the threshold of the salary to keep greedy officers
honest reduces, but our main results still hold.
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Proposition 1 A G− type officer is honest if and only if w ≥ w∗H .
R− type officers’ behaviour depends on their individual characteristics, the
level of intrinsic motivation and their love of praise, as also on collective repu-
tation. We need, then, to understand the relation between the salary paid to
officers and their esteem in public eyes.
Consider first the case w ≥ w∗H , when, by Proposition 1, G−type officers are
honest. The following proposition highlights parameter values for which there
exist equilibria where reputation-concerned officers may be corrupt even when
material incentives are large enough to keep greedy officers honest. The first part
highlights one of our main results on the overjustification effect: high wages and
parameter values such that greedy agents are honest while reputation concerned
officers are corrupt in equilibrium. We rule out situations where wages are so
high that all agents are honest simply due to extrinsic motivations. Such salaries
would be prohibitively expensive and moreover, when bribes are endogenous to
salaries (e.g., see Mookherjee and Png (1995)) , it is not clear that such a salary
exists.
The full characterization of the set of equilibria and related proofs are in the
Appendix.
Proposition 2 Suppose w ≥ w∗H . If vR ∈ (0, γv
S
1−α ),
9 then
(1) δR = 1 if θ
R ∈ (0, θ1H ] or vR ∈ (0, v1H ];
(2) δR = 0 if θ
R ≥ θ0H and vR ∈ (v0H , γv
S
1−α );
(3) δR = δ
mix
H , where δ
mix
H ∈ (0, 1), if vR ∈ (v1H , v0H), and θR > θ1H , or if
vR ∈ (v0H , γv
S
1−α ) and θ
R ∈ (θ1H , θ0H).
If vR ∈ [ γvS1−α , vS), then
(4) δR = 1 if θ
R ∈ (0, θ0H ];
(5) δR = 0 if θ
R ≥ θ1H .
Proof : see the Appendix.
The intuitive explanation of these results is the following: High salaries
crowd out R − type officers’ individual intrinsic motivations, because an exter-
nal observer cannot unambiguously attribute a high level of intrinsic motivation
to honest behaviour. High salaries, therefore, negatively affect collective repu-
tation. It follows that R − type officers refuse the bribe if either (i) they have
9If R − type officers’ level of intrinsic motivation is high vR ∈ [ γvS
1−α , v
S), the collective
reputation when R− type officers choose to be honest is higher than the collective reputation
when they choose to be corrupt; on the contrary, if their level of intrinsic motivation is low
vR ∈ (0, γvS
1−α ) , the collective reputation is lower when R− type officers choose to be honest.
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a small love of praise, θR ≤ min{θ0H , θ1H} (these bounds, as also the bound v1H
below, are computed in the proof in the Appendix) and therefore they do not
care about collective reputation even when it represents a reputation loss for
them, or (ii) they have a low level of intrinsic motivation, vR ≤ v1H , so that they
are similar to greedy officers; in this case collective reputation is still higher
than their intrinsic motivation due to the presence of S − type officers in the
population. Therefore, there is a reputation gain in being honest- low intrinsic
motivation agents benefit from undeserved praise.
On the other hand, if R − type officers have a high reputation concern,
θR ≥ max{θ0H , θ1H} and are sufficiently intrinsically motivated: vR ∈ [v0H , vS),
they will accept the bribe because the fact that an external observer assigns
a high probability that an honest officer is the greedy type, crowds out their
intrinsic motivation, making it costly for them to be honest: this is the effect of
undeserved shame and the over justification effect.
Figure 1 shows these results. When the salary is high, G − type officers
choose to be honest, decreasing the level of collective reputation. An R − type
officer with a high level of intrinsic motivation feels a reputation loss and then
has an incentive to be corrupt. An R− type officer with a low level of intrinsic
motivation feels a reputation gain and chooses to be honest no matter how much
she cares about being praised. Image concerns make an officer with a high level
of intrinsic motivation (high internal moral standard) more prone to be corrupt
than an officer with the low level of intrinsic motivation.
The next proposition shows that this overjustification effect persists even
when wage is lower so that greedy types are no longer honest. The first such
case is when wages are still high enough to keep R-types honest when they
do not care about reputation at all (w ≥ w∗L ≡ (1−q)Bq − v
R
q ,). As wages
decrease, the negative externality from G− types dissappears. However, wages
that guarantee that low intrinsic motivation agents are honest create a negative
externality for R type individuals who have a high intrinsic motivation and high
image concerns: the wages are still too high to rule out extrinsic motivations as
the motivation to be honest. However, the range of parameters over which the
effect of undeserved shame and overjustification occurs is smaller than before
as wages are lower. This can be seen in Figures 2 and 3.
Proposition 3 Suppose w ∈ [w∗L, w∗H); then
(1) δR = 1 if θ
R ∈ (0, θ1M ] or vR ∈ (0, v1M ];
(2) δR = 0 if θ
R ≥ θ0M and vR ∈ (v0M , vS);
12
Figure 1: An illustration of R − type officers’ behavior when G − type officers
are honest (w ≥ w∗H).
(3) δR = δ
mix
M , where δ
mix
M ∈ (0, 1), if vR ∈ (v1M , v0M ) and θR > θ1M or if
vR ∈ (v0M , vS) and θR ∈ (θ1M , θ0M ).
Proof: see Appendix.
Finally, when w < w∗L, then R− type officers are honest only if they are less
intrinsically motivated and have a strong love of praise: a large reputation gain
is the only reward that can push them to be honest. As intrinsic motivation
increases, if there is no concern for reputation, then an intrinsically motivated
R type would be honest. However as soon as there is a positive concern for
reputation, the collective reputation effect crowds out intrinsic motivation to be
honest. The detailed description of all the equilibria in this range of parameters
is contained in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose w ∈ (0, w∗L); then
(1) δR = 1 if θ
R ≥ θ1L and vR ∈ (0, v1M );
(2) δR = 0 if θ
R ∈ (0, θ0L] or vR ∈ [v0M , vS);
(3) δR = δ
mix
L , where δ
mix
L ∈ (0, 1), if vR ∈ (0, v1M ) and θR ∈ (θ0L, θ1L), or if
vR ∈ (v1M , v0M ) and θR > θ0L.
Proof: see Appendix.
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Figure 2: An illustration of R − type officers’ behavior when G − type officers
are dishonest and w ∈ [w∗L, w∗H).
Overall, this section showed that when officers are motivated both intrinsi-
cally and by image/reputation concerns, then higher wages are not necessarily
associated with higher probity in public life. If there is a large correlation
between the level of intrinsic motivation and image concerns then the over-
justification effect implies that even though greedy types are honest, many of
the reputation concerned officers will not be as they suffer undeserved shame
at being pooled with greedy types. The intuition behind this is that higher
salaries lower the signal precision about intrinsic motivation (as in BT). Unlike
BT, this effect persists even at lower salaries albeit the range of parameters
for which it occurs is smaller. Unlike BT, jobs which attract individuals with
low intrinsic motivation do not suffer the over-justification effect, because they
benefit from undeserved praise from being pooled with saints. When wages are
low, such individuals will be more motivated to work than those who are highly
intrinsically motivated. Higher salaries help to make greedy types honest but
have ambiguous effects on others depending on the level of intrinsic motivation
and reputation concerns. The main driving force in our model is that image
concerns are always relative to a personal moral standard: the overjustifica-
14
Figure 3: An illustration of R − type officers’ behavior when G − type officers
are dishonest and w ∈ (0, w∗L).
tion effect arises from being misunderstood in the public perception of one’s
intentions- sometimes it has a positive effect and sometimes a negative one.
4 The impact of increasing officers’ salary on the
level of corruption
So far we have described the various equilibria that exist at different intervals of
the salary. We are interested in the overall effect of increasing officers’ salary on
the level of corruption but this is not easily predicted. While G− type officers’
propensity to accept a bribe unambiguously decreases when the salary increases,
the way that R− type officers react to a salary increase depends on the levels of
their intrinsic motivation and the love of praise. Thus, whether officers will be
more or less prone to accept a bribe after a pay rise depends on their type, and
the overall impact will depend on the proportion of each type among officers’
population. The following two propositions illustrate the different effects that
increasing salary may have on the level of corruption, measured as the fraction
of officers who accept a bribe. Increasing salaries weakly reduces G− type offi-
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cers’ propensity of being corrupt. Therefore, anytime a pay rise lowers R− type
officers’ propensity to corruption, it reduces the level of corruption. This hap-
pens when R-type officers have sufficiently low moral standards or sufficiently
low weight on reputation concerns.
Proposition 5 Suppose that either
(i) vR ∈ (0, v1H ] and θR < θ1L; or
(ii) vR ∈ (max
{
v0M ,
γvs
1−α
}
, vS) and θR < min
{
θ0M , θ
0
H
}
. If the salary in-
creases from any w ≤ w∗L to any w ≥ w∗L,10 then the level of corruption de-
creases.
Proof: see Appendix.
In case (i) R − type officers have a low level of intrinsic motivation as well
as low reputation concerns. A pay rise from w ∈ (0, w∗L) to w ∈ [w∗L, w∗H)
does not affect G − type officers’ behaviour because they are corrupt when
the salary is below the threshold w∗H . However, the rising salary modifies the
behaviour of R− type officers who, after the pay rise, stop accepting bribes, as
described in Proposition 3. When R− type officers have a low level of intrinsic
motivation, an increase in salary works in the same direction as an increase
in reputation. This is because R − type officers with low moral standards are
motivated by a reputational gain (undeserved praise). A further pay rise turns
the G−type officers honest and therefore reduces the propensity of being corrupt
of every officer to 0. In case (ii), R − type officers are sufficiently intrinsically
motivated and care very little about reputation. Not surprisingly, given our
previous discussion, this is the case in which the crowding out effect of a pay
rise is very limited and therefore the direct positive effect of a pay rise prevails.
Next, we present our main result showing how an increase in salary that
makes greedy agents honest may lead to higher corruption among the R-types,
because it crowds out their motivation by reducing the collective reputation of
their profession and thereby reducing the precision of the signal.
The following propositions highlight the trade-off that a policy to fight cor-
ruption may have to confront: a pay rise may reduce G−type officers’ propensity
to be corrupt, while increasing R− type officers’ propensity of being corrupt be-
cause it crowds out their motivation by reducing the collective reputation of
their profession.
10We focus on comparison of two public salary intervals but not on incremental increases
in salary levels because most policies of salary increases to fight corruption are not marginal
increases. Empirical research (e.g., Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang,
2015) also focuses on the effectiveness of considerably increases in salary to reduce corruption
rather than incremental increases.
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Proposition 6 Suppose that either
(i) vR ∈ [v1H , v1M ], θR > θ1H , and α > β1−δmixH ; or
(ii) vR ∈ [v0H ,min{v0M , γv
S
1−α}], θR > max{θ1M , θ0H}, and α > βδmixM .
In both cases, if the salary increases from the interval w ∈ [w∗L, w∗H) to w ≥ w∗H ,
the level of corruption increases.
Proof: see Appendix.
In case (i) above, an increase in salary that reduces officers’ collective rep-
utation turns R− type officers, who have an intermediate level of intrinsic mo-
tivation and strong reputational concerns, from being corrupt with probability
zero to being corrupt with positive probability δmixH . In case (ii), an increase
in salary that reduces officers’ collective reputation turns R− type officers from
being honest with positive probability, δmixM to being honest with probability
zero. In both cases, a pay rise increases R − type officers’ propensity of being
corrupt. If there are sufficiently many agents of this type, even if a pay-rise
reduces G− type officers’ propensity of being corrupt, the overall effect of a pay
rise is counter-productive, and the level of corruption increases.
The above propositions highlight how difficult is to predict the effect of a
pay rise on the level of corruption. Still, our analysis offers some guidelines to
policymakers, about the cases when a salary increase may have a paradoxical
effect on the level of corruption.
Remark 1 he higher is the fraction of officers who are highly reputation-concerned
and have high moral standards, the more likely a pay rise may have the perverse
effect of increasing corruption among officers.
5 The choice of working in the public sector:
Selection
Until now we have assumed that all types of agents work in the public sector. We
now focus on selection into the public sector as a function of relative salary. Our
goal in this section is to show that selection issues may be an additional reason
which causes crowding out of motivation of R types. When the salary in the
public sector increases relative to the private sector, it will attract greedy types
who will be corrupt unless the public sector salary is high enough. This lowers
the reputation payoff for R types who are highly intrinsically motivated and
the overjustification effect kicks in. We see that starting from a low wage, low
corruption scenario when the public sector wage relative to the private sector
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wage goes up then corruption increases due to selection effects. Policies to
prevent this from happening are either to increase salaries in the public sector
until greedy types are no longer corrupt, however, this will cause R types to
become corrupt and this policy will cause a big burden on the public exchequer.
Alternatively, salaries can be reduced such that greedy types do not enter the
public sector so that both criteria can be fulfilled at the same time. We show
that this conclusion depends crucially on the composition of R types in the pool-
if they do not care about reputation or have low intrinsic motivation then an
increase in salary may be the optimal policy to reduce corruption. Either way,
even if corruption reduces due to an increase in salary, it may crowd out the
intrinsic motivation of the R types. We show this in the cases below with some
simplifying assumptions.
There are two sectors in the economy. A public sector job provides intrinsic
motivation, as before but a job in the private sector does not provide any in-
trinsic motivation11. Thus, the only motivation to work in the private sector is
the monetary compensation. Each worker decides whether to work in the public
sector, of size z < 1, or in the private sector of size 1 − z. We consider a large
stationary economy (−∞ < t < +∞) in which at each time t the public sector
re-recruits z officers. If there are more applicants to the public sector, candi-
dates are randomly selected and those who are not selected end up working in
the private sector.
We assume that the large majority of agents are greedy so β tends to one,
γ < z, that is the number of incorruptible agents (saints) is not enough for
the needs of the public sector, but α + γ > z, which implies that the number
of reputation-concerned agents and saints is larger than the size of the public
sector. In the private sector, firms pay an exogenous competitive salary wP .
The salary in the public sector is chosen in order to minimise (i) the cost of
hiring z officers (ii) the amount of corruption. A benevolent planner chooses
the optimal policy that meets these two criteria, according to a social welfare
function. Let wG denote the salary paid in the public sector (government).
This simple model allows an analysis of the agents’ choice of which sector
they want to be employed in, to design the optimal wage offered in the public
sector. Furthermore, it makes simple predictions of the effects that a negative
shock on the private sector will have on the level of corruption in the public
sector. We first consider an ideal situation in which a planner manages to
11See i.e., Wilson (1989), Tirole (1994), Sheehan (1996) and Besley and Ghatak (2005).
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attract only motivated agents in the public sector and takes advantage of this
matching to have low salaries and no corruption.
A greedy agent who works in the public sector behaves honestly only if
wG ≥ (1−q)q B. Let wH be the minimum salary that keeps reputation-concerned
officers honest when saints and reputation-concerned officers apply to the public
sector and greedy agents do not apply to the public sector:
wH + vR + θR
[
q(γvS + αvR)
α+ γ
− vR
]
= (1− q)
[
wH +B +
qθR(γvS + αvR)
α+ γ
]
.
(4)
Rearranging (4), we get
wH =
(1− q)
q
B − qθ
R(γvS + αvR)
α+ γ
− v
R(1− θR)
q
. (5)
The salary wH is lower than the salary that is needed to keep a greedy officer
honest (wH ≤ (1−q)q B). If (i) vR ≤ q
2γvS
α+γ−q2α ≡ vCR;12 or (ii) vR > vCR and
θR ≤ vR
vR− q2(γvS+αvR)γ+α
≡ θCR then R-type officers are honest. In the first case,
reputation-concerned officers have a low level of intrinsic motivation and they
get a reputation gain from the collective reputation of the public sector. In the
second case, they are motivated by a high level of intrinsic motivation and do
not have a strong love of praise. In the case that only saints and reputation-
concerned officers work in the public sector, these officers have an additional
motive to behave honestly rather than only being motivated by monetary in-
centives, which allows a planner to offer low salaries. Let
wP1 ≡
(1− q)
q
B − v
R(1− q)(1− θR)
q
and
wP0 ≡ wP1 −
qθR(1− q)(γvS + αvR)
α+ γ
Proposition 7 If wP0 ≤ wP ≤ wP1 , vS ≥ max{v¯HS , vˆS(wp)} and either of the
following conditions holds: (i) vR ≤ vCR, or; (ii) vR > vCR and θR ≤ θCR,
the optimal compensation policy to minimise corruption in the public sector is
to offer a salary equal to wH identified by (5). In equilibrium all greedy workers
work in the private sector and motivated workers work in the public sector. The
level of corruption is zero.
Proof : see the Appendix.
12This threshold is the same as vR
H− identified by (41) in Appendix to prove Proposition 3.
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Consider now the consequences of an economic shock that produces a fall in
the competitive salary offered in the private sector. Namely, suppose that the
salary in the private sector reduces to w˜p < (1 − q)(wH + B): now working in
the public sector is attractive for greedy officers.
If the salary in the public sector does not change, then corruption arises
directly because greedy agents apply for a job in the public sector and choose to
be corrupt. The fraction of corrupt officers is equal to β, which by assumption
tends to one. Since corruption is widespread, a benevolent planner has two
policies to fight corruption. The first policy aims to increase the salary in the
public sector to raise the opportunity costs of corruption for greedy officers.
The minimum salary that induces greedy officers to be honest is wG = 1−qq B.
In this case, the collective reputation of a job in the public sector tends to zero
because citizens assign probability near to one that an honest officer is a greedy
type. A reputation-concerned officer prefers to accept a bribe if
(1− q)
q
B + vR(1− θR) ≤ (1− q)[ (1− q)
q
B +B]
which clearly holds if and only if θR ≥ 1.13
In this case, the overall level of corruption tends to zero (because by assump-
tion β tends to one), but reputation-concerned officers’ motivations are crowded
out.
Lemma 1 Suppose that θR ≥ 1 and (i) the salary in the public sector is equal
to wG = 1−qq B and (ii) the salary in the private sector is w
P ≤ (1−q)q B+vR(1−
qθR). Hence, all types of agents apply to the public sector. Greedy officers and
saints behave honestly, while reputation-concerned officers are corrupt.
A policy that implies an increase in the remuneration of public officers during
a recession may be hard to implement. An alternative policy is to reduce the
salary in the public sector in order to discourage greedy agents to apply to the
public sector. Let w˜p denote the salary paid in the private sector satisfying
condition (ii) in Lemma 1. If the planner decides to lower the salary in the
public sector, then reputation-concerned officers will be corrupt and the level
of corruption will be αα+γ . This discussion can be summarised by the following
remark.
Remark 2 Economic recession attracts non-motivated agents into the public
sector. A benevolent planner can either react by increasing salaries in the pub-
lic sector that incentivise non-motivated agents to be honest. If most of the
13Note that θCR > 1. Therefore, this condition θR ≥ 1 is compatible with the condition
previously imposed that θR ≤ θCR.
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agents are greedy, the planner restores a negligible level of corruption, even if
motivations for reputation-concerned agents are crowded out. Alternatively, the
planner can lower the salary in the public sector, to discourage greedy agents to
apply, but it induces a positive level of corruption among reputation-concerned
officers.
A shock on the private sector has a similar effect as a pay rise in the public
sector because it makes it more attractive to work in the public sector for greedy
officers. For simplicity, we start from a situation in which only motivated agents
work in the public sector and the (technical) assumptions in Proposition 7 guar-
antee that this is the case. If it is possible to only attract motivated workers,
the optimal salary is the minimum that keeps motivated (reputation-concerned)
officers honest. There is a shock which causes the salary in the private sector
to drop and therefore greedy officers are attracted by the public sector. Policies
that the planner may implement to fight corruption can make motivated officers
dishonest.
This simple extension of our model with two sectors shows, as pointed out
in the previous section, that there may exist situations in which greedy officers
are honest while reputation-concerned officers are corrupt. More importantly, it
points out that the remuneration policy in the public sector is not only relevant
to design incentives to fight corruption, but also to determine the composition
of the workforce. Corruption is not only a problem of moral hazard but also
of adverse selection, and this latter consideration has not received the same
attention than the former one.
6 Conclusion
Why does corruption take place in the public sector? We introduce a model
based on the key premise that public officers’ behaviour is driven by a mix of
motivations: monetary incentives, intrinsic value for honesty and the love of
praise. This mix varies across individuals, and, importantly, the distributions
of types among the population affects individual behaviour through its effect on
collective reputation. A pay rise that lowers greedy officers’ propensity to be
corrupt may have an opposite effect on reputation-concerned officers, because
it crowds out officers’ collective reputation by questioning their true motive to
be honest.
It is important to point out that it is the presence of image concerns about
intentions and the internal moral standards that are important for the result- in
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an alternative interpretation, suppose prestige is defined differently and is higher
when fewer officers are caught being corrupt.14 Then, there is no trade off-
higher salaries imply lower corruption for everyone absent any selection issues.
Assume now that prestige is defined as the collective reputation about the level
of intrinsic motivation to be honest, but that all R types are positively affected
by reputation regardless of initial level of intrinsic motivation (the analysis would
correspond to the case in which vR = 0)- higher salaries will still lead to crowding
out as collective reputation goes down due to pooling with G types. But of
course sufficiently high salaries imply lower corruption.
We summarise the main message of this paper in the following way: policies
that aim to undermine the benefits of corruption have to be coupled with those
that make working for the public good more prestigious, as Paul Collier lucidly
state in a recent policy paper (2016): ”Until well into the 19th century, the
British public sector was very corrupt. [...]. By the late 19th century, the British
Civil Service had become honest and competent. This transformation was largely
fortuitous rather than the result of a properly thought-through strategy. But its
success reveals the key components of how change can be brought about. [....]In
Britain, two key things – closing off the major opportunities for corruption and
making working for the public good more prestigious and satisfying than abusing
office for private gain – happened together. These two approaches are jointly
critical in breaking cultures of corruption.”
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
Given that R− type officers refuse to accept a bribe in equilibrium. In this
case, the level of collective reputation is equal to
αvR + γvS
α+ β + γ
= αvR + γvS ≡ c1H (6)
This is a Nash equilibrium if the following inequality holds:
w + vR + θR(qc1H − vR) ≥ (1− q)(w +B + qθRc1H) (7)
Substituting (6) into (7), leads to the following expression
θR[q2(αvR + γvS)− vR] ≥ (1− q)B − qw − vR. (8)
14This definition of course has some problems about conflating lower enforcement with lower
perceived corruption, but let us ignore that for the argument.
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Since by hypothesis w ≥ w∗H , from (3), we get
(1− q)B − qw − vR < 0. (9)
The right side of equation (8) is negative and, since θR > 0 by assumption, it
follows that (7) is valid whenever
q2(αvR + γvS)− vR ≥ 0, (10)
Condition (10) defines a cutoff v1H ,
0 < vR ≤ q
2γvS
1− q2α ≡ v
1
H , (11)
such that for any level of intrinsic motivation vR ∈ (0, v1H ], an R − type officer
chooses to be honest with probability one no matter how much she cares about
being praised. If v ∈ (v1H , vS), we get
q2(αvR + γvS)− vR < 0, (12)
then an R− type officer chooses to be honest if and only if θR ∈ (0, θ1H ], where
θ1H ≡
−(1− q)B + qw + vR
vR − q2(αvR + γvS) . (13)
An R − type public officer whose intrinsic motivation is vR ∈ (v1H , vS) chooses
to be honest with probability one if and only if θR ∈ (0, θ1H ].
When w ≥ w∗H , an R− type officer chooses to be corrupt if and only if
w + vR + θR(qc0H − vR) ≤ (1− q)(w +B + qθRc0H) (14)
where c0H ≡ γv
S
β+γ is collective reputation when saints and greedy officers are
honest; substituting c0H into (14), leads to the following expression
θR
(
q2γvS
β + γ
− vR
)
≤ (1− q)B − qw − vR, (15)
from (9) and given that θR > 0, (15) is satisfied when
q2γvS
β + γ
− vR < 0. (16)
We obtain a cutoff value
vR >
q2γvS
β + γ
≡ v0H (17)
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Therefore, if vR ∈ (v0H , vS), an R− type officer chooses to be corrupt if and only
if θR ∈ [θ0H ,+∞), where
θ0H ≡
−(1− q)B + qw + vR
vR − q2γvSβ+γ
. (18)
When w ≥ w∗H , anR−type officer whose intrinsic motivation vR ∈ (0, γv
S
1−α ) is
indifferent between being honest and corrupt if and only if there is a δmixH ∈ (0, 1)
such that
w + vR + θR(qcmixH − vR) = (1− q)(w +B + qθRcmixH ), (19)
where
cmixH ≡
δmixH αv
R + γvS
δmixH α+ β + γ
. (20)
Substituting (20) into (19), we obtain
δmixH =
(β + γ)[(1− q)B − qw − (1− θR)vR]− q2θRγvS
α{q2θRvR − [(1− q)B − qw − (1− θR)vR]} . (21)
For any vR ∈ (v0H , γv
S
1−α ), if
(1− q)B − qw − (1− θR)vR < q2θRvR, (22)
then
(β + γ)[(1− q)B − qw − (1− θR)vR]− q2θRγvS <
(β + γ)q2θRvR − q2θRγvS .
(23)
By the assumption 0 < vR < γv
S
β+γ , we obtain
θRq2[(β + γ)vR − γvS ] < 0, (24)
and by (22) and (23), δmixH < 0, which implies that the solution to (19) does
not belong to (0, 1). δmixH > 0 holding requires
q2θRvR − [(1− q)B − qw − (1− θR)vR] < 0, (25)
which implies
θR >
vR + qw − (1− q)B
vR(1− q2) ≡ θˆH . (26)
For all θR > θˆH , δ
mix
H > 0 if and only if
(β + γ)[(1− q)B − qw − (1− θR)vR]− q2θRγvS < 0. (27)
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If vR ∈ (v1H , v0H), we get vR − q
2γvS
β+γ < 0, and (27) holds for all θ
R > θˆH .
For all θR > θˆH , suppose v
R ∈ (v1H , γv
S
1−α ), by (25), δ
∗
H+ < 1 if and only if
(β+γ)[(1−q)B−qw−(1−θR)vR]−q2θRγvS > α{q2θRvR−[(1−q)B−qw−(1−θR)vR]},
(28)
which equals to
θR[q2(αvR + γvS)− vR] < (1− q)B − qw − (1− θR)vR < 0. (29)
(29) defines a cutoff value
θR >
−(1− q)B + qw + vR
vR − q2(αvR + γvS) ≡ θ
1
H > θˆH . (30)
Therefore, if vR ∈ (v1H , v0H), there exists a δmixH ∈ (0, 1) if and only if θR > θ1H .
Suppose vR ∈ [v0H , γv
S
1−α ), we get v
R − q2γvSβ+γ > 0, (27) defines a cutoff value
θR <
−(1− q)B + qw + vR
vR − q2γvSβ+γ
≡ θ0H . (31)
Suppose θR > θˆH and v
R ∈ (v0H , γv
S
1−α ], (29) holds if and only if
(β+γ)[(1−q)B−qw−(1−θR)vR]−q2θRγvS > α{q2θRvR−[(1−q)B−qw−(1−θR)vR]},
(32)
which defines a cutoff value
θR >
−(1− q)B + qw + vR
vR − q2(αvR + γvS) ≡ θ
1
H > θˆH . (33)
To conclude, if vR ∈ (v0H , γv
S
1−α ), an R − type officer chooses to be honest with
probability δmixH ∈ (0, 1) if and only if θR ∈ (θ1H , θ0H).
Furthermore, we analyze the case in which vR ∈ [ γvS1−α , vS). Suppose vR ∈
[ γv
S
1−α , v
S), we have c1H ≥ c0H . Then, we get 0 < θ0H ≤ θ1H . The above analysis
implies that in this case, an R− type officer chooses to be honest if and only if
0 < θR ≤ θ0H , (34)
and chooses to be dishonest if and only if
θR ≥ θ1H . (35)
When θR ∈ (θ0H , θ1H), there is no equilibrium. 
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Proof of Proposition 3:
Define w∗L ≡ (1−q)Bq − v
R
q , when w ∈ [w∗L, w∗H), an R − type officer chooses
to be honest (δR = 1) if and only if
w + vR + θR(qc1M − vR) ≥ (1− q)(w +B + qθRc1M ), (36)
where
c1M =
αvR + γvS
α+ γ
. (37)
Substituting (37) into (36), leads to the following expression
θR[
q2(αvR + γvS)
α+ γ
− vR] ≥ (1− q)B − qw − vR. (38)
Since by hypothesis w ≥ w∗L, from the definition of w∗L, we get
(1− q)B − qw − vR ≤ 0. (39)
The right side of equation (38) is non-positive and, since θR > 0 by assumption,
it follows that (36) is valid whenever
q2(αvR + γvS)
α+ γ
− vR ≥ 0, (40)
Condition (40) defines a cutoff v1M ,
0 < vR ≤ q
2γvS
1− q2α− β ≡ v
1
M , (41)
such that for any level of intrinsic motivation vR ∈ (0, v1M ], an R − type officer
chooses to be honest with probability one no matter how much she cares about
being praised.
If vR ∈ (v1M , vS ], we get
q2(αvR + γvS)
α+ γ
− vR < 0, (42)
then an R− type officer chooses to be honest if and only if θR ∈ (0, θ1M ], where
θ1M ≡
−(1− q)B + qw + vR
vR − q2(αvR+γvS)α+γ
. (43)
An R − type officer whose intrinsic motivation is vR ∈ (v1M , vS) chooses to be
honest if and only if θR ∈ (0, θ1M ].
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When w ∈ [w∗L, w∗H), an R − type chooses to be dishonest (δR = 0) if and
only if
w + vR + θR(qc0M − vR) ≤ (1− q)(w +B + qθRc0M ), (44)
where
c0M = v
S , (45)
is collective reputation when only saints are honest; substituting (45) into (44),
leads to the following expression which leads to
θR(q2vS − vR) ≤ (1− q)B − qw − vR, (46)
from (39) and given that θR > 0, (46) is satisfied when
vR ≥ q2vS ≡ v0M . (47)
Therefore, if vR ∈ (v0M , vS), an R − type officer chooses to be corrupt if and
only if θR ∈ [θ0M ,+∞), where
θ0M ≡
−(1− q)B + qw + vR
vR − q2vS . (48)
Therefore, an R − type officer whose intrinsic motivation vR ∈ (v0M , vS)
chooses to be dishonest if and only if θR ∈ [θ0M +∞) where θ0M > θ1M > 0.
When w ∈ [w∗L, w∗H), an R− type public officer is indifferent between honest
and dishonest if and only if there is a δmixM ∈ (0, 1) such that
w + vR + θR(qcmixM − vR) = (1− q)(w +B + qθRcmixM ), (49)
where
cmixM ≡
δmixM αv
R + γvS
δmixM α+ γ
. (50)
Substitute (50) into (49), get
δmixM =
γ{q2θRvS − [(1− q)B − qw − (1− θR)vR]}
α{[(1− q)B − qw − (1− θR)vR]− q2θRvR} . (51)
If
(1− q)B − qw − (1− θR)vR < q2θRvR, (52)
by 0 < vR < vS , we get
(1− q)B − qw − (1− θR)vR < q2θRvR < q2θRvS . (53)
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δmixM < 0 violates the assumption that δ
mix
M ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, δmixM > 0 if and
only if
q2θRvR < (1− q)B − qw − (1− θR)vR < q2θRvS . (54)
Define θˆM ≡ v
R+qw−(1−q)B
(1−q2)vR > 0, if v
R ∈ (v1M , v0M ), δmixM > 0 holds for all
θR > θˆM . If v
R ∈ (v0M , vS), (54) defines a cutoff
θˆM < θ
R <
vR + qw − (1− q)B
vR − q2vS ≡ θ
0
M . (55)
For all θR > θˆM , δ
mix
M < 1 if and only if
γ{q2θRvS−[(1−q)B−qw−(1−θR)vR]} < α{[(1−q)B−qw−(1−θR)vR]−q2θRvR},
(56)
so we get
θR[
q2(αvR + γvS)
α+ γ
− vR] < (1− q)B − qw − vR. (57)
If vR ∈ (v1M , vS), (57) defines a cutoff
θR >
−(1− q)B + qw + vR
vR − q2(αvR+γvS)α+γ
≡ θ1M , (58)
and θ1M > θˆM .
Therefore, suppose vR ∈ (v1M , v0M ), there exists a δmixM ∈ (0, 1) if and only if
θR > θ1M . If v
R ∈ (v0M , vS), δmixM ∈ (0, 1) exists if and only if θR ∈ (θ1M , θ0M ). 
Proof of Proposition 4:
When w ∈ (0, w∗L), an R − type officer chooses to be dishonest (δR = 0) if
and only if
w + vR + θR(qc0M − vR) ≤ (1− q)(w +B + qθRc0M ), (59)
where
c0M = v
S . (60)
Substituting (60) into (59), leads to the following expression
θR(q2vS − vR) ≤ (1− q)B − qw − vR. (61)
By the hypothesis 0 < w < w∗L, we get
(1− q)B − qw − vR > 0. (62)
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The right side of equation (61) is positive and since θR > 0 by the assumption,
it follows that (59) is valid whenever
vR ≥ q2vS ≡ v0M (63)
For any level of intrinsic motivation vR ∈ [v0M , vS), an R − type officer chooses
to be dishonest with probability one no matter how much she cares about being
praised.
If vR ∈ (0, v0M ), we get
q2vS − vR > 0, (64)
then an R− type officer chooses to be dishonest if and only if θR ∈ (0, θ0L] where
θ0L ≡
(1− q)B − qw − vR
q2vS − vR . (65)
An R − type officer whose intrinsic motivation vR ∈ (0, v0M ) chooses to be
dishonest if and only if θR ∈ (0, θ0L].
When w ∈ (0, w∗L), an R− type officer chooses to be honest (δR = 1) if and
only if
w + vR + θR(qc1M − vR) ≥ (1− q)(w +B + qθRc1M ), (66)
where
c1M =
αvR + γvS
α+ γ
. (67)
Substituting (67) into (66), we get
θR
[
q2(αvR + γvS)
α+ γ
− vR
]
≥ (1− q)B − qw − vR. (68)
From (62) and given that θR > 0, (68) is satisfied when
vR <
q2γvS
1− β − q2α ≡ v
1
M . (69)
Therefore, if vR ∈ (0, v1M ), an R − type officer chooses to be honest if and if
θR ∈ [θ1L,∞) where
θ1L ≡
(1− q)B − qw − vR
q2(αvR+γvS)
α+γ − vR
. (70)
When w ∈ (0, w∗L), an R − type officer is indifferent between honest and
dishonest if and only if there is a δmixL ∈ (0, 1) such that
w + vR + θR(qcmixM − vR) = (1− q)(w +B + qθRcmixM ), (71)
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where
cmixM ≡
δmixL αv
R + γvS
δmixL α+ γ
. (72)
Substituting (72) into (71), we get
δmixL =
γ{q2θvS − [(1− q)B − qw − (1− θR)vR]]}
α{[(1− q)B − qw − (1− θR)vR]− q2θRvR} . (73)
For any w ∈ (0, w∗L), from (62), we get (1− q)B − qw − vR + θR(1− q2)vR > 0
holds for all θR > 0. Therefore, δmixL > 0 if and only if
(1− q)B − qw − (1− θR)vR < q2θRvS . (74)
If vR ∈ (0, v0M ), then (74) defines a cutoff
θR >
(1− q)B − qw − vR
q2vS − vR ≡ θ
0
L. (75)
And δmixL < 1 if and only if
γ{q2θRvS−[(1−q)B−qw−(1−θR)vR]} < α{[(1−q)B−qw−(1−θR)vR]−q2θRvR},
(76)
which leads to
θ[
q2(αvR + γvS)
α+ γ
− vR] < (1− q)B − qw − vR. (77)
If vR ∈ (v1M , v0M ), (77) holds for any θR > 0. If vR ∈ (0, v1M ), then (77) defines
a cutoff
θR <
(1− q)B − qw + vR
q2(αvR+γvS)
α+γ − vR
≡ θ1L. (78)
When w ∈ (0, w∗L), suppose vR ∈ (0, v0M ), there exists a δmixL ∈ (0, 1) if and
only if θR ∈ (θ0L, θ1L). If vR ∈ (v1M , v0M ), there exists a δmixL ∈ (0, 1) if and only
if θR > θ0L. 
Proof of Proposition 5: (i) Suppose vR ∈ (0, v1H ], θR < θ1L, and w ∈
(0, w∗L), R − type officers choose to be corrupt with positive probability. By
Proposition 1, G − type officers are corrupt. When the salary increases to
w ∈ [w∗L, w∗H), G − type officers are still corrupt. By Proposition 3, R − type
officers with vR ∈ (0, v1H ] and θR < θ1L choose to be corrupt with probability
zero. Therefore, the level of corruption decreases to β. When the salary further
increases to w ≥ wH∗, G− type officers become honest. R − type officers with
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vR ∈ (0, v1H ] and θR < θ1L still choose to be honest with probability 1. The level
of corruption is zero.
(ii) By Proposition 4, suppose vR ∈ (max
{
v0M ,
γvs
1−α
}
, vS), and θR < min
{
θ0M , θ
0
H
}
,
when the salary is w ∈ (0, w∗L), R − type officers choose to be dishonest with
probability 1. By Proposition 1, G − type officers are corrupt. Therefore,
the proportion of corrupt public officer is α + β. When the salary increases
to w ∈ [w∗L, w∗H), G − type officers are still corrupt. R − type officers with
vR ∈ (max
{
v0M ,
γvs
1−α
}
, vS) and love of praise θR < min
{
θ0M , θ
0
H
}
choose to be
honest with positive probability. The level of corruption decreases. When the
salary further increases to w ≥ wH∗, G− type officers become honest. R− type
officers with vR ∈ (max
{
v0M ,
γvs
1−α
}
, vS) and θR < min
{
θ0M , θ
0
H
}
chooses to
be honest with probability 1 so that all three types are honest. The level of
corruption further decreases. 
Proof of Proposition 6:
(i) When the salary is w ∈ [w∗L, w∗H), G−type officers are dishonest. R−type
officers whose intrinsic motivation vR ∈ [v1M , v1H ] and love of praise θR > θ1H
choose to be honest with probability one. The proportion of corrupt public
officers is β. When the salary increases to w ≥ wH∗, G − type officers choose
to be honest. R − type officers whose intrinsic motivation vR ∈ [v1M , v1H ] and
love of praise θR > θ1H choose to be corrupt with a positive probability δ
∗
H .
The proportion of corrupt public officer is (1 − δmixH )α. Furthermore, if β <
(1− δmixH )α, the level of corruption increases.
(ii) When the salary is w ∈ [w∗L, w∗H), G − type officers are dishonest. R −
type officers whose intrinsic motivation vR ∈ [v0H ,min{v0M , γv
S
1−α}] and θR >
max{θ1M , θ0H} choose to be honest with probability δmixM . The level of corruption
is β + α(1 − δmixM ). When the salary increases to w ≥ wH∗, G − type officers
choose to be honest. R− type officers with vR ∈ [v0H ,min{v0M , γv
S
1−α}] and θR >
max{θ1M , θ0H} choose to be honest with probability zero. The level of corruption
is α. If α > β
δmixM
, the level of corruption increases. 
Proof of Proposition 7: A greedy officer does not apply to the public
sector if
wp ≥ max{wG, (1− q)(wG +B)} . (79)
A saint applies to the public sector if
wG + vS ≥ wP , (80)
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and chooses to be honest if
wG + vS ≥ (1− q)(wG +B). (81)
An honest reputation-concerned agent applies to the public sector if
wG + vR + θR
[
q(γvS + αvR)
α+ γ
− vR
]
≥ wP . (82)
If the salary offered in the public sector is wH ≤ (1−q)q B, greedy officers
prefer to work in the private sector if wP ≥ (1− q)(wH +B), or
wP ≥ (1− q)
q
B − qθ
R(1− q)(γvS + αvR)
α+ γ
− v
R(1− θR)(1− q)
q
≡ wP0 .
Suppose wP ≥ (1− q)(wH + B), we have wP ≥ wH . Conditions (80) and (81)
require that, given wP , there exists a vˆS(wP ) such that for all vS ≥ vˆS(wP ),
wH + vS −wP ≥ 0 and a v¯HS such that for all vS ≥ v¯HS , we have qwH + vS −
(1− q)B ≥ 0.
The fourth condition holds if
wP ≤ (1− q)
q
B − v
R(1− q)(1− θR)
q
≡ wP1
When the salary in the public sector is fixed at w = wH , all officers behave
honestly and collective reputation of the public sector is equal to γv
S+αvR
α+γ . At
a lower salary reputation-concerned officers will be corrupt, therefore wH is the
minimum salary that allows a corruption free public sector. 
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